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BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION*
TESTIMONY BY: TIMOTHY J. MURIS**
 
 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present testimony on the status of the FTC’s 
National Do Not Call Registry.1
As you know, the Commission adopted the Registry as one of the amendments to the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) announced December 18, 2003, and formally promulgated in 
the Federal Register on January 29, 2003.  On March 11, 2003, President Bush signed into law 
the Do Not Call Implementation Act (DNCIA), which provides for the FTC to collect fees from 
sellers and telemarketers to fund the establishment and maintenance of the National Do Not 
Call Registry.  Congress enacted this legislation, and provided complementary appropriations,2 
to support the FTC’s decision to establish such a Registry (conditioned on funding) as part 
of its amendment of the TSR.3  The DNCIA also set a short deadline for the FCC to finish a 
rulemaking proceeding, already in progress, reviewing that agency’s telemarketing regulations 
(originally promulgated in 1992) pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 
and required the FCC to maximize consistency with the FTC’s Do Not Call rules.  Accordingly, 
the FCC announced its adoption of complementary do not call regulations on June 27, 2003, and 
formally promulgated them in the Federal Register on July 25, 2003.
Both sets of regulations prohibit companies subject to the respective agencies’ jurisdiction from 
calling consumers who enter their phone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry database 
established and maintained by the FTC.  Both agencies set October 1, 2003 as the date when 
they would begin enforcing the Do Not Call Registry provisions, and when telemarketers and 
sellers would be required to refrain from calling consumers who had placed their numbers in the 
Registry.
The Registry opened to accept consumer registrations on June 27, 2003, and within three days 
more than ten million phone numbers had been registered.  Fourteen states have shared the 
contents of their registries with the National Do Not Call Registry, contributing over nine million 
phone numbers.4  As of September 28, 2003, there were more than 51.5 million phone numbers 
in the Registry. 
On September 2, 2003, the Registry became available to telemarketers who wished to gain access 
to the database so that they could refrain from calling consumers who had expressed a preference 
not to receive telemarketing calls.  Since then, over 13,000 organizations have subscribed, and of 
those, more than 400 have accessed and paid for the entire Registry.
Shortly after the FTC promulgated the amended TSR, two telemarketing trade associations 
filed separate legal challenges to various provisions of the amended Rule, including the 
National Do Not Call Registry provisions.  The Direct Marketing Association and several of its 
members brought suit in federal district court in Oklahoma City,5 and the American Teleservices 
Association and several of its members sued in the federal district court in Denver.6  The 
American Teleservices Association also challenged the FCC’s revised telemarketing rules in a 
separate lawsuit.7  Regrettably, a decision in the American Telemarketing Association’s challenge 
to the FTC’s Rule may leave the FTC unable to put into effect the Registry, even though it has 
received overwhelming support from consumers and from Congress.
On September 23, 2003, Judge West in Oklahoma City issued a summary judgment order 
invalidating the Registry provisions on the grounds that the FTC lacked statutory authority 
to establish such a Registry.  Congress acted with unprecedented speed to pass a new law 
eliminating the problem that Judge West had perceived.  We are grateful to Chairman McCain, 
Senator Hollings, Chairman Tauzin and Congressman Dingell, and all the other members of 
Congress who acted so fast and so overwhelmingly to demonstrate their support for the Registry. 
The President signed this legislation into law on Monday, September 29.
Nevertheless, Congress had barely finished its work when U.S. District Judge Nottingham in 
Denver ruled that the Do Not Call Registry offends the First Amendment because it makes a 
content-based distinction between its treatment of commercial telemarketing calls to sell goods 
or services and noncommercial calls soliciting charitable contributions.  We believe that as a 
matter of law this decision is incorrect, and are therefore confident of ultimate success on appeal. 
Nevertheless, this legal dispute could take years to resolve.  In the meantime, the status of the 
Registry is unsettled.
The Commission is acting to comply with Judge Nottingham’s order “enjoining the FTC from 
enforcing the amended Rules (issued in December 2002) creating and implementing a federal 
Do Not Call Registry.”  This is not a simple or straightforward matter, because the decision may 
have far reaching repercussions beyond its impact on the FTC. 
As noted, the FCC has revised its TCPA regulations to prohibit any company under that 
agency’s jurisdiction from calling consumers’ numbers that appear on the National Do Not Call 
Registry.  Chairman Powell of the FCC has announced that the FCC will enforce its do-not-call 
rules against telemarketers that have obtained the Do-Not-Call list from the FTC, beginning 
October 1.8  He noted that the recent court cases have not disturbed the FCC rules, and that the 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals had refused to block the FCC’s rules pending review – as the 
telemarketing industry had urged – citing the strong public interest of leaving the rules in place. 
Chairman Powell stated that the FCC intends to continue to administer and enforce its rules 
to the fullest extent possible as the litigation proceeds.  These steps are made more difficult 
because it is unclear the extent to which Judge Nottingham’s decision permits the FCC to access 
the Registry for enforcement or companies under FCC jurisdiction to access the Registry for 
compliance with the FCC’s rules.
Similarly, Judge Nottingham’s ruling threatens the ability of the states with do not call laws to 
enforce them.  The TCPA prohibits any state that has a do not call registry from enforcing its 
do not call law unless its registry includes the phone numbers of consumers from that state who 
are on the National Do Not Call Registry, which the FCC has established as a single national 
do not call database as part of its revised TCPA regulations.9  Because it is unclear the extent 
to which Judge Nottingham’s decision permits the states to access the Registry for purposes of 
enforcement of state law, the decision casts doubt on the ability of states to enforce their do not 
call laws.
We believe that the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal because the district 
court’s decision reached an unprecedented conclusion that telemarketers have a constitutional 
right to continue telemarketing calls to consumers who have indicated that they do not want these 
calls.  This holding is at odds with the relevant Supreme Court cases.  Specifically, the court 
erred in its application of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 
of New York.10  Under Central Hudson, a regulation of truthful nondeceptive commercial speech 
will survive First Amendment scrutiny if 1) the government asserts a substantial interest; 2) the 
regulation directly advances that interest; and 3) the regulation is reasonably tailored to serve that 
interest.
With respect to the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the Denver court recognized that the 
interest the Registry is designed to advance, protecting consumers from unwanted telemarketing 
calls, is a substantial one. Millions of consumers have signed up for the Registry in the hope 
that it would shield them from unwanted telemarketing calls. As the district court noted, “[t]he 
government’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is of the 
highest order in a free and civilized society.”11
We disagree, however, with the court’s analysis of the second prong of the Central Hudson test, 
the requirement that the Registry must materially advance the government’s interest in protecting 
consumers from unwanted telemarketing calls.  The court conceded that the Registry “might 
eliminate anywhere from forty to sixty percent of all telemarketing calls for those who subscribe, 
a substantial amount of unwanted calls.”12  Indeed, as a result of the FCC’s complementary 
TCPA regulations, the Registry will likely shield consumers from as many as eighty percent of 
unwanted calls.  Because the Registry would put a halt to a substantial percentage of unwanted 
telemarketing calls, it materially advances the government’s interest.13
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the Registry could not pass muster under Central Hudson 
because the Registry does not also apply to charitable solicitations – even though charitable 
solicitation constitutes fully protected speech.14  The court criticized the TSR’s accommodation 
of protected charitable solicitation as “content based,” and therefore - in its view - as 
impermissible under City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.15  The court appears to have 
ruled out any distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech in the regulation of 
telemarketing.  In fact, the court’s decision puts the FTC in an awkward position – in order to 
protect consumers from unwanted commercial calls, the FTC would run the risk of creating an 
impermissible infringement on fully protected speech.  The court’s reasoning is erroneous, for 
three reasons.
First, the court erred in supposing that there is “no doubt” that calls soliciting charitable 
contributions are equally as invasive as commercial calls.16  On the contrary, as the Eighth 
Circuit recognized in Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., Congress itself, in enacting the 
TCPA, concluded that “non-commercial calls . . .  are less intrusive to consumers because they 
are more expected.”17
In this regard, the Court also failed to note that reasons directly related to the abuses the 
Do Not Call rules seek to remedy compelled the FTC’s determination to exempt charitable 
solicitation calls from the National Do Not Call Registry Requirements (while subjecting them 
to the company-specific do not call provisions).  For eight years, the Rule has contained a 
company-specific do-not-call provision, which was intended to shield consumers from unwanted 
telemarketing calls, but until March 31, 2003, this provision applied only to commercial 
telemarketers.18  Although the record shows that this provision failed to achieve its goal with 
respect to commercial telemarketing calls because those telemarketers frequently ignored 
consumers’ requests to be put on company-specific lists, there was no comparable evidence 
that for-profit telemarketers who solicit on behalf of charities will ignore the company-specific 
provision.  There is also no record evidence that, with respect to charitable solicitors, the 
company-specific provision will not achieve the FTC’s goal of protecting consumers from 
unwanted telemarketing.  In fact, evidence on the record indicates that the different incentives 
that govern charitable solicitations as compared to commercial solicitations may make the 
company-specific approach more workable and effective with respect to charitable solicitations.  
Accordingly, the record provides ample reason, directly related to the abuses the Registry is 
aimed at, for treating charitable solicitations differently.
Second, the district court ignored the context in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue in 
Discovery Network. In that case, the ordinance’s exception for non-commercial newsracks made 
the ordinance ineffective in addressing the public purpose in question - preventing the clutter 
and disruption on city sidewalks engendered by newsracks - because commercial newsacks 
comprised only a very small proportion of newsracks overall.19  By contrast, the TSR’s Do Not 
Call Registry provisions cover the vast majority of telephone solicitations, especially in light of 
the FCC’s complementary rule. This fact distinguishes Discovery Network.20
Third, in assessing the “fit” of the Do Not Call Registry under Central Hudson, the court failed 
to take into account the minimal nature of any governmental intrusion on speech.  Unlike the 
ordinance in Discovery Network, the National Do Not Call Registry does not ban any speech; 
it only facilitates consumer choice whether particular speech is welcome.  Even assuming the 
district court was correct in concluding that the Registry nevertheless imposes some level of 
burden on speech, the degree of any such restriction is relevant to an assessment of whether the 
measure is “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”21  The Do Not Call Registry 
has been carefully tailored, allowing commercial telemarketing to be directed at all consumers 
except those who have specifically requested that they be spared such intrusions.  Such a system 
is consonant with the underlying purpose of the commercial speech doctrine - i.e., enhancing 
consumer welfare by ensuring the availability of information consumers value.22
More than fifty million telephone numbers are now in the Registry.  All these consumers have 
stated that they want an end to telemarketing calls.  The Rule’s Do Not Call Registry provisions 
that protect consumers were scheduled to take effect on October 1, 2003.  The FTC has moved 
for a stay of the district court’s order, but if the stay is not granted, tens of millions of consumers 
will continue, after that date, to receive those telemarketing calls.23  By contrast, if a stay is 
granted, telemarketers will be restrained from calling only those consumers who have signed up 
for the registry and who have declared their lack of interest in telemarketing sales calls.  Indeed, 
the Direct Marketing Association, a telemarketing industry trade association, has recently stated 
that it “remains committed to respecting . . . the wishes of all consumers no matter how those 
wishes have been expressed.”24  We believe we have a strong argument for success in our motion 
for a stay, and we are hopeful that a stay will be granted.
It is hard to imagine a more graphic expression of public interest than the Congressional response 
to Judge West’s September 23, 2003, decision holding that the FTC lacked statutory authority 
to create the registry.  Within only forty-eight hours of that decision, both houses of Congress 
passed legislation expressly ratifying the registry.  We hope that the strong public interest 
embodied in Congress’s recent enactment will not be thwarted.
For over two years, the highest priority of the FTC has been simple: to allow consumers to 
choose whether to accepted unsolicited telemarketing calls in their homes.  Even before the 
National Do Not Call Registry was to become effective, Americans registered more than fifty 
million phone numbers with the FTC.  Millions have also registered with similar state lists.
This simple concept has been surprisingly difficult to implement.  The FTC spent a year 
reviewing the rule and another year soliciting and considering comment from sellers, 
telemarketers, and consumers.  Every effort was made to accommodate the industry’s concerns 
about the original proposal, refining and revising it, for example, to permit a company to call 
consumers on the registry if they have an established business relationship with that company. 
Despite our efforts, the telemarketers have used every weapon in their formidable arsenal to 
deprive consumers of choice.  The FTC will continue to make every effort to give consumers an 
effective choice about stopping unwanted and intrusive telemarketing calls.
________________________________________
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